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Summary 
This paper explores the methodological options for assessing or measuring the impacts of 
closing civic space on development. It summarizes a review of literature on the forms and 
spread of efforts to restrict civic space, and its impacts on civil society actors and their 
contributions to development. It briefly discusses the conceptual framework developed, 
which focuses on understanding the nature of the fit between states and civil society actors 
in relation to development, and on how this differs according to the distribution of political 
power, and the degree of elite commitment and state capacity to deliver broad-based 
development. The paper then discusses methodological options for assessing or measuring 
the impacts of changes in civic space for development, noting the challenges of cross-
national regression analysis, including the mixed record of research on the relationships 
between growth or development and democracy or other political variables. It explains the 
rationale for in-depth country case studies of episodes of contention in areas of civic 
activism that are most likely to impact on frontline development outcomes (poverty, 
hunger, etc). It then discusses the methodological learning from two country case studies in 
Pakistan and Ethiopia. The paper concludes with a discussion of the nature and limitations 
of available data sources, and sketches suggestions about two approaches to tracking and 
analysing the impacts of changes in civic space for development. The first is qualitative 
comparative case analysis across a set of 12-20 countries, to analyse the effects of specific 
episodes of contention around civic space in relation to development outcomes, using 
longitudinal tools and rigorous comparative techniques to establish with confidence the 
causal mechanisms through which closures of civic space impact on development 
outcomes.. The second is building NGO/CSO capacity to track the impacts of new 
restrictions on their activities and contributions in a grounded, locally-relevant way.   
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1. Introduction: the problem of closing civic space for inclusive 
development 
 
This paper discusses methodological challenges and options for assessing or measuring the 
relationship between changing civic space and development outcomes. It is part of a larger 
effort to build a robust conceptual framework and explore the possibilities, including data 
sources, for robust empirical analysis of this relationship.1 The present paper starts with a 
discussion of the nature of closing civic space and the mechanisms through which it is likely 
to shape development outcomes. It discusses the options for analysing the relationship 
between closing civic space and development outcomes using a) rigorous, cross-national 
analytical techniques, and b) in-depth case studies. It then reflects on the lessons from case 
studies that explored the possibilities of assessing the developmental impacts of changes in 
civic space empirically, through case studies undertaken in Ethiopia and Pakistan. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of the different approaches 
reviewed, and then offers suggestions regarding data sources, the sectoral and thematic 
focus, and comparative and other methodological approaches to the assessment of how 
changes in civic space are likely to impact on development. 
 
1.1. Changing civic space2 
The past decade saw a growing number of governments in developed and developing 
countries, spanning the range of political systems from open and democratic to closed and 
authoritarian, restrict the activities of civil society. Civil society refers to all forms of 
voluntary organization that mediate between the state, market, and societal actors and 
interests. In developing countries, civil society is often taken to refer to non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs), often aid- or foreign-funded, 
involved in service delivery or undertaking a ‘watchdog’ function by holding government 
and other actors to account. However, civil society is generally viewed as a broader category 
of actors that includes the media and human rights defenders, professional associations, 
academia and thinktanks, and social movements such as land and indigenous people’s rights 
groups, women’s and peasant movements, labour organizations, and environmental 
activists.  
 
Many developing countries have long traditions of civil society, but formal organisations in 
the specifically liberal democratic tradition proliferated worldwide after the end of the Cold 
War. This was linked to the rapid growth in aid financing to civil society, particularly during 
the 1990s and 2000s, and particular to service-providing actors. A first wave of restrictions 
on civil society, including in developed countries, were introduced during the War on Terror, 
almost two decades ago. The recent wave of restrictions on civic space, dating to the past 
five years, must be understood in the context of the relatively recent growth of such 
organisations in most developing countries. New restrictions on the space for civic action 
have taken formal legal, political, and administrative forms, as well as informal and extra-
legal – but no less potent - tactics such as violence, threats, and the domination of public 
space to de-legitimate and stigmatize civil society actors (Carothers and Brechenmacher 
2014; Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2016; Howell and Lind 2010; Hayman et al. 2014; Rutzen 
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2015; KIOS Foundation 2015; ICNL 2016; van der Borgh and Terwindt 2012; Van der Borgh 
and Terwindt 2014; CIVICUS 2016, 2015, 2017).  
 
Efforts to shrink civic space aim to preserve, consolidate or increase the power of state or 
political actors (Mendelson 2015b; Hayman 2016; Poppe and Wolff 2017), pushing back 
against a real or perceived expansion of civil society power (Mathews 1997). Such efforts 
are often framed in terms of assertions of national sovereignty against the imposition of 
foreign (or Western liberal democratic) values, for instance in relation to the promotion of 
gender equality or the rights of sexual minorities. Not all new regulations on civil society 
have been unwelcome, even by civil society actors; without effective regulation, the rapid 
earlier expansion enabled inefficiencies and abuses. And in principle, new regulations 
purport to strengthen the governance and accountability of civil society, and to assert 
national sovereignty over the development process. In practice, new restrictions are often a 
heavy-handed mixture of stigmatization and de-legitimization, selective application of rules 
and restrictions, and violence and impunity for violence against civic actors and groups, 
motivated by the concentration or consolidation of political power.  
 
These restrictions have not affected all civil society actors equally. Their objects are typically 
groups and organizations from a liberal and human rights tradition, usually aid-funded and 
with strong transnational links, as well as their allies in social movements, the media and 
academia. For these groups, civic space has undeniably shrunk. However, the emergence of 
new types of actors and forms of civic action mean that it is more accurate to conceptualize 
civic space not as closing or shrinking overall, but as changing, in terms of who participates 
and on what terms (Hossain et al. 2018). Changes in the past decade include the rapid 
growth of the digital public sphere, and a rise in ‘uncivil society’, in the form of both 
rightwing, extremist, and neo-traditionalist groups, as well as ‘unruly’ protest groups and 
movements. That civic space is changing rather than shrinking also fits with the observation 
that many civil society actors report co-optation and pressure to align politically. Apparently 
liberal new laws on civil society and the media may be accompanied with strong political 
pressure to align with the party in power, so that civic space may be wider in theory than in 
practice. 
 
There is an important transnational dimension to much contention over civic space. The 
targets of closing civic space are frequently supported by international aid, while their critics 
accuse them of promoting foreign values and interests. At the same time, case study 
findings indicate that the shift in the normative atmosphere in the development climate 
with the rise of Chinese investment licenses ruling elites to constrain their civil societies 
when politically convenient. So while efforts to restrict civic space are part of struggles over 
national political power, they are also strongly shaped by transnational forces, as these 
shape relations between state and civil society.  
 
 
1.2 Civil society, development and the SDGs 
Changes in the civic space are likely to impact on development in numerous ways, because 
of the contributions civil society does, or has the potential to, make to development. The 
role of civil society is an important aspect of theories of democratization and development 
(G. White 1994), but the principal focus here is on the contributions of civil society to 
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economic and sociocultural, rather than to the political, dimensions of development. From 
the literature review, we can summarize these as: 
• Institution-building: most notably, enabling the historical emergence and regulation 
of institutions and values such as trust that underpin economic growth and ensure 
its sustainability; this includes enabling the management of discontent and 
difference in relation to the nature and distribution of growth 
• Partnership- and alliance-building: civil society has played an important role in 
generating international and cross-sectoral support and financing for development  
• Accountability: ensuring governments and other actors face scrutiny and are 
answerable for their policies and practices, helping prevent corruption, abuse, and 
other failures of governance 
• Empowerment and inclusion: raising and amplifying voice among marginalized and 
disempowerment groups; enabling such groups to mobilize to claim rights and 
recognition  
• Protection: defending human rights; protecting vulnerable groups against poverty, 
violence, or exclusion; advocating for and providing humanitarian, emergency or 
welfare services  
• Information and communication: gathering evidence and undertaking analysis of the 
development process; monitoring and evaluating development policies and 
programmes; investigating and documenting governance failures, corruption etc; 
raising questions about governmental performance and business practices; wider 
public communication and education regarding development policies and practices. 
 
A substantial literature has been generated on each of these aspects of the contribution of 
civil society to the development process (Hossain et al. 2018). 
 
Yet while civic space may be ‘essential to the healthy functioning and development of any 
society’, and ‘an essential precondition for human rights, social justice and accountable 
governance’ (Malena 2015, 11), there may be no simple or direct relationship between civic 
space and measurable development outcomes. Measurement of these contributions to 
development is complicated by the different times, levels and parts of the system, often at 
several removes from measurable frontline development outcomes such as poverty or 
human development, through which these mechanisms operate. Development thinking has 
tended to emphasise the complementary role of civil society, but civic action can also be at 
odds with public policy on development, slowing or creating friction in the implementation 
of government policies opposed by particular groups. Civil society may not always be ‘civil’, 
and it may not work towards what development partners view as the public good. Its 
activities are frequently contentious, and friction between states and civic actors is as likely 
as cooperation and partnership.  
 
While civil society as often brings contention as it complements development policy, 
‘development’ is itself a contested term. While often used as a shorthand for economic 
growth or the social and economic transformations that measurably increase human 
capabilities, the emphasis within the current Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is on 
the quality of processes of change, and on the extent to which they are inclusive and 
equitable, environmentally sustainable, and ‘leave no one behind’. Restrictions on civil 
society may ultimately contribute to declining economic growth or worsening public service 
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delivery, yet more immediate impacts are likely for the equity, inclusiveness, or 
sustainability of growth and change. Theory and past experience suggest that civil society 
can have a ‘civilizing’ effect, tempering a tendency that may otherwise prevail for 
exploitative forms of capital accumulation and dispossession that enable growth and 
enrichment, but only for those with the power to shape the institutions and processes 
governing development.  
 
Despite its complexities, then, the range of activities and functions ascribed to civil society 
supports the view that the space for civil society to operate is essential to achievement of 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular the injunction to ‘leave no one 
behind’ (HLPE 2013; PartnersGlobal et al. 2017). The 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda 
Resolution notes the role of civil society in establishing priorities and goals, and in fostering 
development partnerships (UN 2015). Civil society played a prominent role in the 
achievements of the MDGs, and is assumed to be equally important in deliberating over, 
delivering, and monitoring the SDGs (Alliance and CIDSE 2014). A preparatory forum for the 
2017 High-Level Meeting of the Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation 
concluded that Governments should ‘improve the policy, legal and regulatory environment 
so civil society and business can maximize their contribution to development’, and that 
Development Partners should support the capacity of governments to establish and carry 
out multi-stakeholder partnerships (Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-
operation 2017).  
 
Of the SDGs themselves, SDG 16 aims to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for 
sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable 
and inclusive institutions at all levels’. SDG 16 is the SDG on which efforts to restrict civic 
space are likely to have the most immediate and measurable first-order impact, as it 
provides measures of the capacities of NGOs, CSOs, human rights defenders and other 
actors in the civic space to perform their functions and roles in safety and security. 
However, SDG 16 by no means exhausts the pathways through which development 
outcomes are likely to be affected. SDG 16 can provide some key measures of a) how 
changes in civic space impact on what civil society actors do, but our knowledge of how civil 
society impacts on development entails in addition assessing b) how such restrictions 
impacts on how development policies and programmes are made and delivered. In addition, 
c) it is necessary to trace impacts through to the services and protections different people 
receive and their capacities to enjoy the benefits of development. SDG 16 includes 
indicators of a) and aspects of b), but a comprehensive measure of the development 
impacts of closing civic space will need to connect the functions and activities of civil society 
and the policy and programmatic bases of development with c) the frontline impacts on 
human development, including poverty and hunger, gender equality and health and 
education outcomes. This entails connecting SDG 16 with the frontline development 
outcome indicators of poverty and hunger, gender inequality, health, education, etc.  
 
Despite the clear sense that changes in civic space are likely to impact on development 
outcomes, efforts to track or monitor these changes have been limited to date. CIVICUS has 
been monitoring the effects of changes in civic space for SDG 16 through the CIVICUS 
Monitor, which includes several SDG 16 Targets, including 16.7 (‘ensure responsive, 
inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels’) and 16.10 (‘ensure 
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public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with 
national legislation and international agreements’) (CIVICUS 2016). However, as an indicator 
of developmental impacts of closing space, SDG 16 has some limitations. First, the adoption 
of the SDG 16 goal was contentious, with countries resistant to the imposition of liberal 
democracy goals within the SDG framework; it may therefore not be a strategic focus for 
efforts to track or measure the impacts of changing civic space on development. Second, 
while restrictions on civil society may work directly against the achievement of SDG 16, 
most visibly in relation to the safety of human rights defenders (Target 16.10), it is less 
obvious how such restrictions work their way through to impacting on other frontline 
human development outcomes, such as poverty or hunger reduction, as noted above. While 
SDG 16 offers a valuable set of measures of some of impacts on civil society functions and 
activities, then, it needs to be analysed together with other SDGs for an integrated analysis 
of what restrictions on civic space are likely to mean for both development processes and 
human development outcomes.  
 
1.3 Conceptualizing impacts within the politics of inclusive development  
Restrictions on civic space impact on different actors, levels and stages of a development 
process that is itself shaped by broader political economy forces and power relations, 
including the nature of the relationship between civil society, political actors and the state. 
How power is distributed, and how successfully civil society and the state engage on 
processes of inclusive development is likely to lead to systematically different outcomes. 
 
The ‘developmental state’ argument against civic space 
The strong economic growth and human development performance associated with 
countries with neither a strong tradition of independent civil society organizations or liberal 
civic space, such as China, Vietnam, Rwanda and Ethiopia, have challenged the view that 
such conditions are necessary for rapid, broad-based development. The ‘developmental 
state’ thesis - that ruling elites may need to silence critics and repress dissent to buy the 
long-time horizons needed to kickstart economic and social transformations – is used to 
justify controls on civic space across a variety of political-economic settings, including 
unequivocally predatory authoritarian regimes.  
 
One response to this argument is to note that the quality and sustainability of development 
in settings where civil society has been restricted is questionable, because civil society has 
been unable to play its ‘civilizing’ role with respect to the pattern of development. High 
growth and rapid social policy gains aside, minority and marginalized groups tend to be 
excluded from or dispossessed or exploited in the development process. Lucrative economic 
investments often take place under conditions that ignore human rights and environmental 
concerns, while grand corruption thrives under conditions of secrecy and a cowed press, 
and can lead to economic and political crises that undermine or even reverse rapid progress. 
While economic ‘take-off’ is not always associated with good governance, the histories of 
episodes of growth and development show that sustaining growth over time depends on 
the establishment of laws and regulations, and pathways to inclusive or shared 
development, which often entail a more open society and wider civic space.3 
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Development as inclusive development that ‘leaves no one behind’ 
How the impact of shrinking civil society space on development outcomes is assessed thus 
depends substantially on what is meant by ‘development’. In the interests of analytical 
consistency, quantitative analysis of the relationship between democracy and development 
has tended to equate development with economic growth (Barro 1996; Doucouliagos and 
Ulubaşoğlu 2008; Heo and Tan 2001; Minier 1998; Plümper and Martin 2003; Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006). A richer and more human-centred conception of development such as the 
Agenda 2030 Declaration frames development as a matter of tackling inequalities of power 
and resources, with the SDGs aiming to:  
 
end poverty and hunger everywhere; to combat inequalities within and among 
countries; to build peaceful, just and inclusive societies; to protect human rights and 
promote gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls; and to ensure 
the lasting protection of the planet and its natural resources (UN 2015).  
 
In its efforts to assess the impacts of shrinking civic space on development, SDG 16, (to 
‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to 
justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’), 
provides a useful starting point, as it draws attention to how changes in civic space affect 
the functions and activities of key civil society actors. SDG 16 emphasises the need for 
development decisions to be made in ways that are inclusive and accountable in order for 
peaceful and just outcomes to ensue, assuming that the process through which 
development comes about will shape the extent to which its outcomes will be inclusive, 
equitable, and sustainable. The greater challenge is to trace these impacts further 
downstream, onto development policy and programme processes, and then onto frontline 
development outcomes such as ending poverty (SDG1) or hunger (SDG2); improving health 
and wellbeing (SDG3), enabling quality education (SDG4), tackling gender inequalities 
(SDG5), and ensuring water and sanitation SDG6). In addition, in line with the SDG 
framework, development performance can be judged against the extent to which it is 
inclusive, sustainable, addresses inequality, and ‘leaves no one behind’, that is, in terms of 
the quality of the development achieved.  
 
Political settlements and the ‘fit’ between civil society and the state  
The developmental state argument draws attention to the underlying political rationale for 
restrictions on civic space. The literature on the politics of inclusive development helps us 
conceptualize how changing civic space may impact on development outcomes, by 
emphasising how political power is distributed, and how that distribution of political power 
shapes the development agenda of ruling elites. (Houtzager 2003) theorizes that civil society 
may be most effective in contributing to inclusive forms of development not to the extent 
that it is autonomous or free from state interference or regulation, but to the extent that 
civic groups enjoy a good ‘fit’ with actors and agencies in the state. A ‘good fit’ means not 
that state-civil society relations are always smooth, but that states can call on civic support 
for their inclusive policies, and anticipate contestation over decisions that unjustly favour 
elites or powerful groups. Contestation is integral to effective civic activism, whereas a lack 
of contention may signal a welfareist role in which civil society poses no effective challenge 
to the state and political power. But relations can be accommodating and inclusive, notably 
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during democratization, and operationally close, as when social and state actors collaborate 
in the ‘co-production’ of services (Joshi and Moore 2004).  
 
The degree of autonomy, influence, and ‘holding power’ of civic actors in relation to the 
state is closely shaped by the nature of the state and the political regime itself, which 
structure the conditions for political inclusion and empowerment (Houtzager 2003). So 
while civil societies make demands for inclusion and empowerment, they does so in 
conditions not of their own making. Recognizing the centrality of political power in this 
‘polity approach’ places state and political institutions at the heart of the explanation of 
how civil society contributes to inclusive development: 
 
Development is not simply about what needs to be done, but, perhaps more 
importantly, about how it is done. Politics, power and the interactive dynamic 
between actors and structures shape institutions and give them substance and 
meaning (Rocha Menocal 2017, 560). 
 
Political settlements, or the ‘balance or distribution of power between contending social 
groups and classes, on which any state is based’ (Di John and Putzel 2009, 4) help us make 
sense of how civil society shapes the development process. This balance of power draws 
attention to whether ruling elites have the stability to undertake reforms needed for long-
term growth and development, but also on how the nature of ruling coalitions shape elite 
commitment and state capacity to deliver inclusive development, including whether they 
incorporate interests in redistributive policies and programmes (Hickey, Sen, and Bukenya 
2015).  
 
Political settlements are rarely static, and the distribution of power and its implications for 
development may shift for a number of reasons. Other than in the most closed states, civil 
society actors have the potential to play a role in both the stability of institutional 
arrangements and the nature of ruling coalitions. Episodes of democratic transition and 
revolution in the past two decades have seen prominent civic engagement with larger 
political struggles. By empowering excluded or marginalized groups, throwing light on 
corruption and holding politicians and officials accountable for failures, violations or abuses 
of power, civil society activity is inescapably political, without necessarily being partisan  
(Gaventa and Barrett 2010; Gaventa and McGee 2013). 
  
Yet there is no automatic relationship between more distributed, democratic arrangements 
of national political power and inclusive development. Rwanda and Ethiopia have combined 
rapid poverty reduction and improvements in human development in closed civic spaces 
where power is dominated by a single party or coalition (Hickey, Sen, and Bukenya 2015; 
Khan 2010), while in more open, democratic and pluralist systems such as Brazil and India,  
social and economic inequalities are wide and intractable (Rocha Menocal 2017; Menocal 
2015). National power struggles are also shaped by transnational influences, ideas and 
resource flows. Both civil society strategies and strategies for shrinking civil society space 
have strong transnational influences (Mendelson 2015a), possibly reflecting the narrowing 
of civic space within the global North and in a multipolar world system (Poskitt, Shankland, 
and Taela 2016). A methodology for measuring the implications of closing civic space for 
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development needs to take into account the different likely mechanisms through which 
these varied struggles play out. 
 
1.4 Mechanisms of impact on inclusive development 
Based on the literature review, several mechanisms through which changes in civic space 
were likely to impact on inclusive development under different conditions of state-civil 
society ‘fit’ and political settlements were proposed (Hossain et al. 2018). These 
propositions drew on a typology of political settlements developed under the Effective 
States and Inclusive Development (ESID) research programme at Manchester,1 and assumed 
that the impacts of closures of civic space would vary according to  
• the extent to which political power is distributed under relatively competitive 
conditions, or dominated by a single party or coalition  
• the presence or absence of state capacity and elite commitment to foster inclusive 
development, including whether ruling elites deploy state capacity to advance 
predatory or developmental agendas.  
 
Figure 1 depicts the key dimensions of the conceptual framework, highlighting the 
possibilities of comparisons across different types of political settlement. Most countries 
can be ranked along the horizontal axis, according to their degree of political competition, 
although that may sometimes be unsettled, or in moments of transition. Most countries can 
also be ranked along the vertical axis marking the nature of that rule, whether it is, broadly 
speaking, developmental and broad-based, or whether power is chiefly used for predatory 
purposes, to enrich ruling elites with impunity. Again, while countries’ development policies 
may be mixed and change over time, medium-term patterns of growth, inequality, poverty 
reduction and human development indicate regimes which are more and less predatory.  
 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual framework for assessing impacts on development of closing civic space 
Nature of rule 
 
 
Developmental 
 
 
 
 
          Predatory 
Degree of political competition 
 
High   Low 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 For more information, see http://www.effective-states.org/. 
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Within this broad typology of countries, we expect specific outcomes for inclusive 
development to depend on how effectively civil society had been engaging with the state 
and political actors on key issues of the economy, social provisioning, or governance.  
 
Overall, it is reasonable to expect that efforts to restrict civic space, even where motivated 
by genuine concerns about fake NGOs or malign foreign interference, are likely to be 
detrimental in the medium- to long-term to the equity, inclusiveness, and sustainability of 
the development process. Where civil society groups have been neutralized, controlled or 
co-opted in the interests of an elite project of rapid development, the adverse effects may 
be offset in part by faster growth, poverty reduction, or human development. In such 
settings, civil society actors may be forced to stop, curb, or change their activities, in order 
to align with the state’s agenda. However, marginalised and powerless groups such as the 
very poor and ethnic or other minorities tend to gain least and lose most when high growth 
is achieved under greatly unequal initial conditions. If civic actors are unable to mobilize 
disempowered groups to demand their rights to livelihoods or public services, or to hold 
state or market actors to account for corruption, land- or resource-grabbing or 
incompetence, patterns of development are likely to be unequalizing and environmentally 
as well as socially unsustainable. Such exclusions, inequalities and rights abuses are 
characteristic of ‘developmentalism’ under conditions where political power is highly 
concentrated.  
 
In states where power is more distributed and pluralistic, efforts to restrict civic space are 
likely to be widely viewed as illegitimate efforts to concentrate political power, to provoke 
resistance and unrest, triggering further unruly or ‘uncivil’ action. Such events tend to 
deepen political polarization and distrust, particularly where associated with violence 
against protestors or activists. In more established democracies with longer traditions of 
independent civic actions, efforts to limit, control or coopt civil society are likely to be 
difficult to sustain over time because civil society tends to become embedded in the political 
process. Such struggles may not materially affect development processes overall, despite 
their evident harm to civil society groups and actors. Nevertheless, countries that are 
formally democratic seem highly likely to attempt to de-legitimate civil society on grounds 
that it is unrepresentative, elitist, or foreign, and to demonstrate their power over NGOs 
and CSOs through heavy-handed restrictions that limit their resources or scope of work.  
 
Predatory authoritarian states often rely substantially on foreign-funded NGOs or CSOs to 
deliver services, in particular the emergency and humanitarian services that are associated 
with many such developing countries. Restrictions on civic space are unlikely to influence 
policymaking or the quality of public service delivery because civil society plays no 
important advocacy or watchdog role to begin with. They may exacerbate economic or 
environmental crises by preventing the free flow of information or services. In all developing 
country settings, it is reasonable to expect that restrictions on civil society will primarily 
affect the most vulnerable and marginalized groups, and that in the absence of formal space 
for civic engagement, mass and popular protest will be more important.   
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These assumptions can be stated as a series of propositions about the politics of inclusive 
development, how restrictions on civic space may be reconfiguring the fit between state 
and civil society, and likely outcome areas: 
 
A. Political settlements presided over by a political system where power is highly 
concentrated in a ruling coalition, and in which the state has capacity and elites are 
committed to fostering faster growth and human development gains (China, 
Vietnam, Rwanda, Ethiopia). Efforts to restrict civic space under such conditions seek 
to bring civil society closer to political power, into alignment with state policies, and 
to silence critique. This may impact adversely on  
a. the rights and needs of marginalized and excluded groups, possibly through a rise 
in rights violations with impunity, or a loss of service access or quality 
b. accountability for macroeconomic performance, as scrutiny and checks by the 
media and civil society are weakened or disabled, possibly leading to impacts on 
the business environment and political trust 
c. environmental sustainability, across a wide range of potential areas and sectors, 
but particularly in relation to land- and resource-grabbing. 
 
B. More competitive political systems, where power is distributed and contested 
(democracies such as India, Brazil and Colombia, and newer or more fragile systems 
such as Kenya, Nepal, Ghana, or Pakistan). Efforts to restrict civic space are generally 
ineffective efforts to silence political opposition to improve electoral chances, and 
are unlikely to change the generally good fit between the state and civil society in 
terms of service delivery. Security and sovereignty are key framings of efforts to 
control civil society, and ‘Western values’ CSOs are stigmatized, losing their 
legitimacy (and state protection) in the civic space. Implications for development 
process and outcome include: 
 
a. narrower civic space may limit the representativeness and inclusiveness of 
democratic dialogue, resulting in exclusionary policy debates or elections run on 
a narrow range of issues, excluding important concerns emerging from within in 
civil society and social movements 
b. less powerful groups - women, workers, small farmers, displaced persons, 
minority groups – tend to be properly incorporated within the political 
settlement, so under closing civic space their political expressions are likely to 
include direct action or resistance to policies they view as unfavourable. 
However, the democratic distribution of power would mean we would not in 
general expect direct or significant adverse impact on development policies and 
programmes for such groups 
c. civil society may become organized along ethnic or partisan lines, so that closing 
space brings it too close to the state to provide effective scrutiny or effective 
accountability over equitable and sustainable development, or too hostile to 
powerholders for constructive engagement. 
 
‘Dominant’ political settlements, where power is concentrated but the ruling elite 
and the state can be characterized as mainly ‘predatory’ (eg Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique, to some extent Cambodia, and until their recent democratic 
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transitions, Burma/Myanmar and Pakistan). In these settings, the fit between civil 
society and governments is mutually tactical, with much reliance on humanitarian 
aid. The fit is also shaped by the fact that domestic civil society is frequently weak 
and vulnerable, aid-dependent, and disconnected from grassroots organizations or 
movements. In such settings,   
a. excluded and marginalized groups are likely to suffer most through a lack of 
voice or political traction with political elites  
b. struggles against powerful ruling elite interests (land-grabbing, extractives, 
monopolies) are likely to fail 
c. we would expect no major protest movements, instead of which people would 
be more likely to exit/migrate where possible, and/or to engage in extremist 
politics and violent resistance. 
 
C. All types of political settlement and civil society-state relations. Closing civic space 
impacts on development through the following: 
a. freedom of speech and association may be seen as direct threats to state power, 
particularly with the growth of cyberspace; efforts to constrict entry to this space 
are as likely as efforts to tap its potential for development 
b. contestation over ‘foreign’ norms promoted by human rights defenders and civic 
actors is politicized and deployed to rationalize restrictions on civic space 
motivated by political power struggles; such contestation is particularly likely to 
affect women’s rights struggles and other purportedly Western or liberal-
democratic value systems; and  
c. wage, resource, and commodity price struggles are likely in each kind of political 
system, reflecting the volatilities of global economic integration.  
 
 
We turn next to a consideration of possible approaches to testing these propositions 
empirically in cross-country, quantitative and in-depth case study and comparative analysis.  
 
 
2. Cross-country analysis & quantitative approaches4 
Cross-national regression analysis of the relationship between changes in civic space and 
inclusive development outcomes is the first methodological choice. Testing propositions 
across a large number of countries and over time has the potential to uncover patterns and 
variances that may confirm, refute, or generate new propositions worth testing. The 
phenomenon of closing civic space has been established beyond doubt. And the theoretical 
and empirical literature on the roles of civil society in development provides sound 
foundations for assuming a relationship between these closures and development 
outcomes. However, the record of quantitative analysis of the effects of changes in 
institutional conditions on development outcomes is mixed. Efforts to explore such 
relationships have been made, notably to identify causal connections between democracy 
and growth, political and economic freedoms and economic growth (Dawson 2003; 
Gwartney and Lawson 2003), human rights and development (UNDP 2000), civil society and 
development (Roy, 2008; Tusalem, 2007), and aid and development (Acht, Mahmoud, and 
Thiele 2015; Dutta, Leeson, and Williamson 2013; Dutta and Williamson 2016a, 2016b; 
 
 
 14 
Reinsberg 2015; Young and Sheehan 2014). However, empirical efforts to settle these 
debate conclusively have generally failed to do so (see Acemoglu et al., 2005, 2014; 
Brückner and Ciccone 2011; Gründler and Krieger 2016). With respect to the quantitative 
measurement of the impacts of closing civic space on inclusive development, there are 
three main challenges: (1) identifying adequate measures of civic space; (2) identifying 
suitable measures of inclusive development; (3) inferring the relation between the two sets 
of measures. 
 
2.1 Measures of civic space 
The first challenge is to quantify the degree of civic space openness in its multiple 
dimensions by building accurate and comparable indicators. The aim for this exercise is to 
gauge the changes in those indicators through time. This challenge has been met by various 
attempts, building sets of indicators or indexes that seek to convey how each country is 
performing, regarding the public space, in multiple or partial aspects, be they economic, 
political (here focusing especially in political actors), civic (with some overlap with the 
previous) or other. Some others focus on political violence and terror, be it enacted by the 
State, criminal or militarized political actors. Notable examples of these initiatives are 
• Bertelsmann Stiftung Foundation’s Transformation Index (BTI; Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Foundation) biannual reports from 2006 to 2016 
• Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Project (CIRI; Cingranelli, Richards, & Clay, 
2014) covering the years from 1981 to 2011 
• Civil Society Organisations Sustainability Index (CSOSI, USAID), with regional reports 
since 1997 
• Fragile States Index (FFP), produced since 2005 
• Freedom House’s yearly Freedom in the World (FH a), reporting since 1972, including 
Freedom of the Press (FH b), since 1980 and, the more recent, Freedom on the Net 
(FH c), produced yearly since 2009 
• Global Barometer Surveys (GBS), a set of surveys of political attitudes from a large 
number of countries, in several rounds from early 2000s onwards 
• Global Integrity Index (GI), intermittent, from 2004 to 2011,  
• Institutional Profiles Database ((CEPII) tri-annually updated since 2001,  
• Media Sustainability Index (IREX), irregularly from 2001 
• Open Budget Index (IBP), from 2006 to 2015 
• Political Terror Scale (Mark Gibney et al.), with a dataset spanning from 1976 to 2015 
• Press Freedom Index (RSF), starting in 2014 
• Women, Business and the Law Database (WB), bi-annual from 2010, and 
• Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank), from 1996 to 2016.  
 
Full descriptions of these sources can be found in the Dataverse Project (2017), Gründler & 
Krieger (2016) and Malena (2015). 
 
These indexes and datasets comprise multiple indicators, including some quantitative 
indicators. Nevertheless, most rely on the yearly construction of categorical variables, more 
precisely of scales between lower and higher degrees of experience of social values 
(freedom, empowerment, accountability, rule of law, consensus building, democratic 
stability, women’s rights, etc) or scales listing higher and lower levels of violence or 
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deprivation of rights (torture, political violence, political imprisonment, etc). To produce 
consensual indicators, the initiatives bring in the collective shared knowledge and 
judgement of experts. In the production of country indexes of its CSOSI, USAID recommends 
that a group of ‘not less than 8 representatives of civil society organizations’ is carefully 
selected, with a precise indication of the required typology. In the production of the BTI, the 
Bertelsmann-Stiftung Foundation supplies the selected experts with a precise and complete 
standardized codebook. Their classifications are reviewed by another expert and then 
normalized between reports to offer comparable international indicators. The Fragile States 
Indexes draw on quantitative socio-economic statistics sourced from international and 
multilateral institutions (the World Bank and various UN agencies); each is standardized and 
a qualitative assessment is also undertaken by a team of social science researchers. All these 
processes, rely, therefore, on judicious assessments conducted by qualified experts, to 
generate synthetic indicators that appear in numeric form. They depend, therefore, on 
continuous judgement, by teams whose composition changes over time, and whose 
members learn and evolve their views of how to assess the realities they are observing. 
 
To study changes in civic space, indicators must agree on the description of civic space for 
each given year and country, and have values for each country of interest and for the time 
period under analysis. The examples nominated already show that this can be a challenge. 
Very few initiatives produced indicators before the early 21st century, and there are gaps in 
for some of the indicators, with some produced every two or three years. The challenge of 
quantitative analysis of changes in civic space openness mirrors that faced in the effort to 
measure democracy. Producing a single indicator for civic space openness would have to 
follow steps similar to those recommended by Munck and Verkuilen (2002) on the 
construction of a ‘democracy index’, namely the choice of a single definition; designing a 
number of instruments able to describe the properties of the theoretical concept chosen; 
and computation of said index through the combination of the selected instruments. 
Gründler and Krieger (2016: 88) found the majority of existing democracy indicators 
suffered from a low level of detail and precision, ‘subjectivity and arbitrariness in the 
conceptualization and the selection of the instruments’, with a major concern being ‘the 
fairly low level of sophistication with regard to the aggregation process and the way in 
which the underlying components are weighted’. Of one widely-used democracy index, Saez 
(2017) noted that indicators showed little variance between countries, and over time were 
likely to lead to common econometric problems and ‘highly distorted and biased results’. 
 
2.2 Measures of inclusive development 
The second challenge is to conduct a similar exercise for indicators of development. 
Measures and indicators of development are inherently difficult, because of the multiple 
dimensions to be captured. For SDG 16 alone (http://www.sdg16.org/map/), the Sustainable 
Development Goal which most directly measures the direct impacts of closing civic space on 
civil society actors, entails 12 targets, to be measured through a total of 23 global indicators. 
Some indicators of SDG 16 are available from human rights defenders and other credible 
sources, including in the governance indicator sets discussed above. SDG 16 outcomes by no 
means exhaust the pathways through which development is likely to be affected, because of 
how the functions and activities of civil society, as protected by SDG 16, impact on how 
development policies and programmes are made and delivered, and through that to the 
services and protections different people receive and their capacities to enjoy the benefits 
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of development. So to measure the impacts of closing civic space, it is necessary to trace the 
direct impacts on civil society actors and functions through to  the frontline impacts on 
human development, including poverty and hunger, gender equality and health and 
education outcomes. 
 
The World Bank’s comprehensive Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) dataset within the 
World Development Indicators framework (WB, 2018) helpfully sets out the agreed SDG 
indicators as available for all countries since 1960. However, SDG datasets are an upgrade of 
those used to monitor the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and reflect the fact that 
‘inclusivity’ was one of the weaknesses of the MDGs, and remains poorly covered by current 
statistics. Progress is rapidly being made on these dimensions of development.2 As the SDG 
principles of equity, inclusiveness and ‘leaving no one behind’ appear, from the literature 
review, to be at greatest risk  from closing civic space, these weaknesses in the current 
datasets are significant problems for any quantitative measures of this relationship.  
 
 
2.3 Measuring the relation between changes in civic space and changes in inclusive 
development 
Where data are available with which to construct the relevant variables, quantitative 
analyses can be rigorous methodologies for identifying or exploring the statistical 
significance of relationships between social indicators. Depending on the methodology and 
data availability, it may in principle be possible to assess relations between closing civic 
space and development outcomes, including to identify associated or correlated outcomes.  
Depending on data availability and a running theoretical hypothesis that econometric 
methods can test, a quantitative analysis can contribute for a better understanding of the 
relationships between civic space and development outcomes. However, data availability is 
a key constraint. With limited data, a great many assumptions must be made, all of which 
reduce the empirical validity of the statistical relations found. As with the measurement of 
civic space, data availability, and the capacity to construct valid indicators are significant 
constraints. Any effort to quantitatively assess or measure the impacts of closing civic space 
on inclusive development through the construction and comparison of summary indexes on 
both sides would, therefore, double the taskload of the ‘Democracy and Growth’ type of 
analyses and accrue the challenges from both sides of the equation. 
 
The challenges of quantitative cross-national analysis also include the time dimensions of 
these processes of change. From our literature review, it is clear that the current wave of 
restrictions on civic space has mostly occurred in the past five years, and followed two 
decades of rapid expansions in the numbers and scope of civil society organizations 
following the end of the cold war. In many instances, these events are too recent for it to be 
reasonably expected that effects will show up in measurable development outcomes.  
 
In addition, as noted above, it is less the freedom of civic space than the nature of the fit 
between state and civil society that is likely to shape the impacts on development 
                                                        
2 See, for instance, the Group-related Inequalities Database developed by Save the Children: 
https://campaigns.savethechildren.net/grid. 
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outcomes. Civil society does not only need free space in which to operate, but also the 
capacity or power to engage the state and political actors when needed. Where important 
parts of civil society and the state are aligned behind common development goals, 
restrictions on civic space may have limited short-term impacts on development progress. 
Conversely, civil society may have the space and freedom to act, but be too weak, divided, 
or disconnected from the challenges of development or from government to act as either an 
effective counterpart or an effective critic. The fit between civil society and the state may 
not always be smooth, and friction is a sign that civil society may be performing its 
necessary roles of empowering or holding to account. It is not clear that cross-national 
analysis is well-suited to capturing the national political dynamics of these struggles in the 
civic space, and how they may play out in the development process or its outcomes. 
 
For these reasons, efforts to assess or measure the impacts of closing civic space on 
development do not indicate the development of composite indices for cross-country 
statistical analysis, but instead imply the need for comparative analysis of detailed case 
studies of contention over selected sectors or policy domains in selected countries that set 
out to analyse the interaction of the political settlement and development policy domain 
with changes in civic space, in order to trace the impacts downstream to SDGs 1-6. 
Statistical data can be used to support the case study development by mapping the 
temporal path of civic space openness and development indicators over time in countries of 
interest, in part to help identify interesting case and to aid case selection. It can also help 
establish statistical relations (dependent on data availability and quality) between civic 
space and development outcomes in a smaller number of cases, using more specialized and 
country-specific datasets to enable comparative analysis across cases; and by providing 
quantitative empirical richness to the analysis of the scale and distribution of development 
impacts in each case. Such data analysis primarily makes sense within an in-depth analysis 
of the fit between civil society and the state in relation to the development process. This in 
turn points to the analysis of specific episodes of contention around policies and 
programmes relevant to frontline development outcomes, as will be discussed below.   
 
3 In-depth country case studies  
 
3.1 Rationale  
The conceptual framework developed from the review of the literature pointed to the need 
to situate analysis within an understanding of the nature of the fit between states and civil 
society, rather than focusing on the size and freedom within the civic space itself. It also 
highlighted the importance of the political settlement, or the balance of power, in shaping 
the mechanisms through which changes in civic space may influence processes and 
outcomes of development. As briefly discussed above, the complexity of the variables under 
consideration mean that even where fairly straightforward cause-and-effect relationships or 
other correlations are indicated, data of the necessary objectivity and detail are not 
available for most developing country contexts over the relevant time periods.  
 
The nature of the problem of changing civic space indicates the need for in-depth analyses 
of how such changes are situated within national political and development processes, 
while remaining attentive to the transnational influences, particularly ideas and finances, on 
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such processes. In-depth analysis tracing processes of change will be necessary to capture 
the complexities of these relationships as they unfold in their specific country settings.  
 
Rather than broad comparisons of quantitative indicators of civic space and development, 
we propose case studies to focus on areas where civic space has been in overt contention. 
That is, case studies should centre on countries, sectors, issues and time periods in which 
civil society actors and the state have been in active mutual confrontation or dispute over 
the rightful roles and responsibilities of civil society and the rights of sovereign states or 
national political actors to determine those, and/or the impunity of attacks on civil society 
actors by non-state actors. These should focus on areas or policy domains that are most 
likely to have significant frontline human development impacts in the short- to medium-
term, such as on poverty, hunger, gender equality, or health and education.  
 
Country case studies may draw on quantitative and qualitative data to develop a ‘thick 
description’ of the contexts within which civic space enters into contention, and to trace the 
impacts of efforts to control civic actors on their ability to contribute to development. These 
contributions can be traced through to broad national functions, for instance, holding 
governments to account over policy issues such as budgetary allocations or fiscal plans, or 
to more sectoral or domain-level matters, such as their capacities to monitor the 
effectiveness or efficiency of public service delivery in particular sectors. The approach will 
combine subjective with objective data on the relationships between civic space and 
development outcomes. As the issues involved are highly politicized and often substantially 
emotive matters, it is important for the case studies to maximize rigour by being designed 
to refine or test pre-specified hypotheses or propositions, and to do so by collecting 
multiple types and sources of data to enable triangulation.5 Case studies will need to 
include:  
• Analysis of the political settlement and power relations within which the contention 
over civic space has emerged; this should analyse the nature of the coalitions over 
which ruling elites preside, and how those are shaped or influenced by actors in the 
civic space, including those supported by aid 
• Evidence of the nature and scale of civil society in that country and domain or 
sector; it should be possible to assess the nature of the fit between state and civil 
society, and of the contributions of civil society to development processes, including 
service-delivery, performance monitoring, and a watchdog or accountability role 
• Analysis of the nature of the development challenge, nationally and in relation to 
specific sectors or domains in contention; this should, as far as possible, go beyond 
descriptive statistics or trends, to provide an account of the issues of equity, 
inclusiveness and sustainability, and of the politics of inclusive development, 
including elite incentives for performance legitimacy in each context 
• Process-tracing of events surrounding episodes of contention relating to closures of 
civic space, featuring before-and-after time-bound analyses of policy making and 
actual practice within the sectors/domains; analysis of firsthand accounts of key 
actors and informants regarding the motivations and effects of such closures; and 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of the impacts on civil society capacities to 
perform its functions in relation to development, with a focus on the implications 
for equality, inclusiveness, sustainability, and groups at risk of being left behind.  
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Country case studies tracing impacts following specific instances of contention around civic 
space in frontline development domains may provide credibly detailed and robust accounts 
of how changing civic space shapes development outcomes at the country or sector level. In 
order to arrive at more generalizable rigorous assessments of the wider implications of 
closing civic space for development, a comparative case methodology is indicated. This 
implies sets of 12 or more case studies using mixed methods, to be selected on the basis of 
criteria derived from the conceptual framework and the variables it proposes. In the present 
case, we would propose a typology of the kind set out below. This typology would enable 
the testing and refinement of the propositions derived from the conceptual framework as 
set out above through comparative analysis, making it possible to identify mechanisms 
recurring across contexts, in order to provide a strong causal analysis of the relationship 
between closing civic space and development outcomes. This could then in turn enable the 
development of theory and further empirical work to test these relationships.6  
 
 
Figure 2 Indicative typology for comparative country case selection 
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3.2 Methodological learning from two country case studies 
 
In 2017-18, case studies were conducted in Pakistan and Ethiopia in an effort to: 
• test some of the propositions set out in the conceptual framework, as relevant to 
the countries’ respective political settlements and state-civil society relations 
• explore the methodological prospects, including data sources, for investigating the 
relationships between changes in civic space and development outcomes 
• where possible, to generate data and analysis to inform advocacy and programming 
in relation to civil society in each country.  
 
For each, a national researcher with knowledge of the issues, setting, and civil society actors 
was commissioned to work with a UK-based researcher with expertise in relation to civic 
space and development issues in the country. Each case study involved preliminary 
literature and data reviews, somewhat over a week worth of key informant interviews and 
meetings involving the UK researcher, and where possible, further interviews, focus group 
discussions and meetings with civil society actors in each country.  
 
The case studies were rapid activities, involving experienced researchers in a short country 
visit, interviews with key informants, and secondary data collection and literature review. To 
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optimize resources and sharpen analytical focus, the study focused on specific episodes 
when civic space had been in contention in areas likely to impact on development; it then 
analysed the development impacts in line with an understanding of the ‘fit’ between civil 
society and the state, derived from debates about the politics of pro-poor or inclusive 
development. The research was politically sensitive, required great caution and trust, and 
could be subject to delays due to political changes. 
 
In each country, the researchers identified specific episodes of contention around civic 
space in which development outcomes were likely to have been affected. The focus was on 
episodes in which service-providing NGOs had faced new restrictions, as instances of direct 
links to frontline inclusive development outcomes of poverty and hunger reduction, and 
gender equality in particular. The selection of these episodes had the advantage of enabling 
analysis of before-and-after scenarios and development outcomes in terms of service-
delivery, and to explore wider implications, in terms of the loss of civil society influence over 
policy processes, development monitoring, or accountability.  
 
One limitation of such direct measures of development impacts, even assuming 
comparatively robust data systems, is that they may cover only some of the potential 
impacts of programme closures. Individual services may have unintended or multiplier 
development impacts not assumed by the theory of change with which a particular NGO is 
working. Several important likely sources of impact could not be measured. Civil society 
actors adapt their activities and/or mutate into different kinds of actors or organizations 
altogether; to analyse this resilience would require organizational life histories to track the 
trajectories of individual civic actors across key moments of change.7 Many NGOs and CSOs 
are adept at managing threats from governments and responding in ways that enable them 
to keep to their mandate without crossing official lines, so that the assessments generated 
by these case studies may be overly negative about the measurable effects on development 
outcomes, or overstate the magnitude of the loss of services provided or received. On the 
negative side, the unmeasured costs of coping with closing space include a high degree of 
stress and personal and organizational costs in coping with restricted civic space. The actual 
risks of violence against civic actors, particularly in relation to land, resource, indigenous, 
women’s and LGBTQI rights defenders, are documented by human rights monitors, but the 
broader personal and organizations costs of civic activism under such conditions are not.  
 
While some figures of expected impacts were available in Pakistan, it was difficult to assess 
these in a robust way, partly because of a ‘general atmosphere of uncertainly and fear 
within which the organisations are currently operating’ and because ‘[o]rganisational 
finances and expenditure have become sensitive issues both because the government has 
targeted these as part of their criticism (specifically the allegation that INGOs [international 
NGOs] may be spending more on staff salaries than on projects), and because INGOs are 
worried about how their current situation may be perceived by donors for ongoing or future 
projects.’8 It seems likely, in addition, that donors and INGOs would develop strategies for 
adapting to, or working around these restrictions, where possible, and that service cuts 
would not be as swingeing as the wholesale closure of the NGOs suggested.  
 
In Ethiopia, the NGO law was long enough in the past to have played out in development 
outcomes, yet the situation with respect to civil society remained sensitive and ambiguous, 
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even under the new leadership. The Ethiopia case study periodized the phases in which civic 
space had been opened and closed, and matched these against relevant development 
indicators. Several important correlations were suggested by this process tracing, but the 
lack of data, as well as sensitivities about the issues and the limited nature of the interviews 
undertaken meant that it was difficult to validate these in any robust way. Data regarding 
service provision of NGOs no longer operational, or which had substantially changed their 
focus or framing of their work, was in short supply. 
 
Nonetheless, the Ethiopia case study also produced several valuable methodological 
insights. The first was the challenges of undertaking counterfactual analysis, and of making 
assumptions about who might have received which services if civic space had not been 
closed down. It was also the case that the legal changes happened several years ago, and 
civil society organizations have adapted, personnel have moved on, and no detailed records 
exist of the loss of NGO service delivery capacity or the number of citizens affected. We do 
know that 1,741 NGOs closed entirely, and that others were forced to withdraw from 
service provision in crucial areas. Only a small number of these individuals could be 
interviewed, although many of these provided evidence of substantial reductions in service 
delivery capacity and development impact.  
 
A key concern in the Ethiopia case is that the short time-frame, and its overlap with the 
State of Emergency made it travel outside the capital impossible. Key informants suggested 
that it is in relatively remote regions that civil society organisations are often most valuable, 
and NGOs reported that the restrictions on their work make it harder to travel and engage 
with marginalised ethnic minorities and other groups in remote rural areas. More extensive 
research would be necessary to measure the nationwide impact of reductions in NGO 
service delivery among these groups at risk of being left behind. Nonetheless, the closure of 
NGOs and their field work and travel restrictions to the most remote regions mean that the 
most geographically marginalized people are likely to be hardest hit. 
 
The atmosphere of fear and secrecy also presented methodological challenges. Fieldwork 
was delayed by widespread demonstrations, killing of protestors and mass arrests that 
culminated in the imposition of a second state of emergency. Obtaining a visa proved 
difficult and protracted. The state of emergency raised very real ethical and security 
concerns about asking Ethiopians to comment on government policies at a time when they 
were rounding up and jailing their critics. After ministerial intervention a visa was eventually 
obtained. The fieldwork was carried out during the state of emergency but after the 
appointment of a new Prime Minster had reduced tensions. Nevertheless, the suspension of 
freedom of speech and jailing of government critics might reasonably be expected to limit 
the candour of interviewees to questions about government policies. Two interviewees 
declined to comment directly on the government, although most were open in both their 
criticism of government policies and acknowledgement of its achievements.  
 
Despite the fact that the NGO restrictions dated back several years, the research findings 
concluded that there were clear signs that NGO services in key areas relating to some of the 
Ethiopian government’s core poverty and hunger reduction priorities, in terms of reaching 
vulnerable populations, had been adversely affected at scale. Programmes delivering legal 
aid and advocacy for women and children were cut significantly, and 1,741 NGOs providing 
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a range of services to the poor and hungry had closed completely. Many of the remaining 
NGOs had significantly reduced service delivery capacity, especially in the areas of advocacy 
for women’s and ethnic minority group rights. People in entire regions were being neglected 
because of strict limits on travel costs which mitigated against rural outreach, inclusion and 
participation of the hardest-to-reach. Upstream policy influencing work, research and 
advocacy had been generally abandoned, in favour of direct service delivery, in particular of 
food aid or welfare programmes.  
 
Coping and adapting to narrower civic space is likely to impact adversely on the quality, 
efficiency, and possibly also the transparency and accountability of aid financing to civil 
society. In addition, the costs of shifting activities from mobilization or empowerment and 
advocacy to service-delivery are likely to be significant in terms of the accountability of 
government policy and the inclusiveness of development. Comparative analysis of periods 
of relative civic space using mixed methods can help measure the impacts on the 
inclusiveness of development in particular periods. Cross-country comparative analysis 
would similarly highlight the contributions of civil society to important development 
functions such as building trust in economic institutions; holding the government, the 
military, or market and external actors to account; empowering disadvantaged and 
marginalized groups and protecting the vulnerable; and monitoring development progress. 
 
4 Conclusions and lessons 
 
4.1 Methodologies for measuring the implications of closing civic space 
Two different approaches to assessing the relationships between development outcomes 
and changes in civic space were explored. Cross-national regression analysis has the 
potential to identify and help explain patterns across large datasets and over time, but the 
weakness of the available data and the need for unverifiable assumptions in the 
construction of key variables prevent any robust cross-national analysis of the relationship 
between closing civic space and development outcomes. There may be opportunities to 
undertake more focused quantitative analyses on a smaller number of variables or within a 
wider case-based comparative analysis, but experience with democracy and development 
analysis discourages cross-national analysis of the complex and multiple relationships 
between civic space and development outcomes. 
 
Instead, the conceptual framework indicated the need for in-depth analysis at country level, 
focusing on mixed method data to analyse recent episodes of contention around civic space 
in which frontline development outcomes are clearly implicated. Rapid country case studies 
in Ethiopia and Pakistan focussed on episodes in which NGOs were targeted with new laws 
to restrict or stop their activities. The case studies traced processes through which 
restrictions on civic space led to or were associated with losses of or changes in service 
provision for particular groups and in selected sectors. Each aimed to set these processes 
within an analysis of how the political settlements, development challenges and traditions 
of civil society shaped the mechanisms of impact. 
 
This paper summarized some of the more clear and measurable adverse impacts, both 
potential and actual, on people living with poverty and marginalization and other potential 
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beneficiaries of aid, such as women and children. Quantifiable numbers of NGOs did or 
would have had to close down, cut services, or limit their outreach in geographical terms. A 
shift from rights advocacy, empowerment and accountability functions towards welfareist 
service provision was also obvious. The methodological limitations of these case studies 
were also discussed, including the inability to measure the effects of NGO and CSO 
strategies to cope with or adapt to the new circumstances, and the sensitivity of the issues 
beind discussed, which led respondents to be cautious or to avoid interviews at all. Even 
well-networked researchers familiar with the context found the issues difficult to research, 
and the ethics of potentially endangering the personal security of interviewees and research 
partners remained a key concern throughout.  
 
 
4.2 Longitudinal case studies and qualitative comparative analysis  
What real-time tracking cannot do is help understand the wider implications and longer-
term institutional consequences of curbing policy advocacy and restricting efforts to prevent 
corruption or strengthen accountability. Analysis of these wider effects would require 
longitudinal and rigorous comparative analysis across episodes of contention within 
carefully selected sets of countries. Longitudinal and comparative case analysis would also 
make it possible to arrive at a robust and generalizable assessment of how civic space 
shapes development outcomes, based on close reading and systematic analysis across 
selected cases. This would include taking seriously the possibility that ‘developmental’ 
motivations for closing civic space reflect elite commitment to inclusive development, and 
authentic concerns about national sovereignty in the development process. Yet it should 
also involve a clear-eyed investigation of which groups or voices are excluded or 
marginalized by the closures associated with such ‘developmentalism’, and the risks 
entailed by the neglect or suppression of discontent or difference in the medium-term.  
 
Longitudinal analysis would enable a more systematic assessment of the roles of civil society 
actors in restraining – or failing to – major destabilizing episodes of corruption or economic 
crisis. Some cross-national qualitative-quantitative analysis of this may also be possible, with 
existing datasets and a strong theoretical framework of the mechanisms. 
 
One example of why comparative analysis is important is in the uncovering of transnational 
influences on the relationship between civic space and development. Both of the rapid 
country case studies highlighted the significance of the influence of Chinese development 
investments on the normative environment. But while individual country case studies are 
valuable for gaining insights into the impacts on development in each country, assessing the 
larger geopolitical forces shaping civic space and the development process requires 
comparative and cross-country research across a larger sample of cases. The preferred 
methodological approach for doing so would be qualitative comparative analysis using the 
in-depth case study methodology described above, across a set of between 12 and 20 cases. 
These would need to be selected on the basis of a theoretical framework, again, as 
described above, and to be selected in order to answer key questions by comparing 
contrasting and similar political settlements and conditions of civic space.9  
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4.3 Data needs and strategies for further analysis 
The data available for measuring the impacts of changing civic space at the country level are 
likely to be variable, but in general, aid-financed NGOs and CSOs appear to maintain 
reasonably good records of their individual activities and outreach (beneficiaries reached, 
services provided, etc), as part of the push to demonstrating results. However, as the 
Pakistan case study discussed here found, there can be sensitivities and fears regarding 
sharing such data. From our reviews of the data and literature, it seems that few countries 
or sectors have civil society or NGO networks that have compiled and collated credible data 
across organizations and/or sectors, and/or which make these readily available. Pressures 
on civic space are only likely to make such data even less accessible. Smaller grassroots 
organizations in areas where contention is particularly high may be at greatest risk of losing 
of funding from restrictions on civil society, but also may be least well-equipped to maintain 
authoritative records of their beneficiaries, activities and outreach. As the Ethiopian case 
suggested, these are also groups in areas where services are first to be dropped, and where 
restrictions on travel mean researchers are least likely to visit. 
 
Civil society tracking  
The challenges of measuring the full extent of the impacts on NGO service provision are, 
therefore, significant. Despite this, some measures of the short-term impacts on some parts 
of development activity were found to be available, and credible. While these are not 
exhaustive of all impacts, even within a single sector, several point to major losses of 
important services for particularly vulnerable and marginalized groups. They also indicate 
that it should be possible to make informed, evidence-based claims about potential or 
actual losses to development progress resulting directly from restrictions on NGOs. 
 
The fragmented nature of the available data may tempt aid donors to make more stringent 
data and documentary demands of potential and actual recipients of funding, including of 
their networks or associations. However, the costs of doing so, and the sensitivities about 
sharing such data mitigate against a stronger emphasis on data collection. Instead, and as 
noted above, because NGO networks and associations appear to maintain patchy, at best, 
data of their members’ activities. We would propose that it would make more sense for 
donors to encourage their partners to develop their own systems for tracking the impacts of 
closing civic space on their programmes and activities, and to do so in a collective way, to 
enable civil society actors to arrive at a group understanding of the scale and nature of the 
challenge, rather than coping and adapting individually and separately.  
 
Civil society could track the impacts on their own activities by systematically recording the 
various efforts, formal and informal, with which governments seek to restrict their activities, 
and their own responses to them. Civil society actors can log their own decisions about how 
they respond to or cope with such restrictions, as well as changes in their own policies and 
practices, arriving at estimates of how these impact on their work with beneficiaries, as well 
as where and how they work, and the quality of their programming. In particular, civil 
society actors should be encouraged to document the responses they feel constrained or 
prevented from making to development policies and programmes, to help track the 
weakening of accountability mechanisms or monitoring systems. In addition, and in the 
interests of achieving a proper balance, civil society actors should also be encouraged to 
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reflect on ways in which new regulations have improved their own practice or performance, 
if any, as well as that of the sector more widely.  
 
Encouraging partners to reflect on the impacts as they unfold will help to build a stronger, 
grounded case against restriction on civic space with which to advocate with governments 
in-country. It should be possible to engage civil society actors and NGOs in particular 
countries in developing a suitable framework for assessing and monitoring these effects 
that will fit the conditions and capacities in different contexts and speak to domestic 
political and development concerns. 
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Notes 
 
1 This paper has been funded by UK Aid, as part of a larger study of the implications of 
closing civic space for development. A literature review and conceptual paper on the issues, 
which provides the basis for the present methodological paper, was funded by two separate 
commissions, one for UK Aid and another for Act Alliance (Hossain et al 2018).  
2 This section summarizes the conclusions of an extensive literature review undertaken as 
part of this research (Hossain et al. 2018). 
3 For a useful summary of these arguments, see (Hickey, Sen, and Bukenya 2015).  
4 This section, and the review of datasets on which it was based, was undertaken by Ricardo 
Santos. 
5 On the value of theory-based small ‘n’ impact evaluation, see (H. White and Phillips 2012) 
6 On mechanism-based causal analysis, see (Demeulenaere 2011; Hedström and Ylikoski 
2010) 
7 See for instance, (Lewis 2008) 
8 From the Pakistan country case study, April 28 draft. 
9 Tools and for the analysis of contentious political episodes and for robust qualitative 
comparative analysis have been widely tested in the relevant literatures. See, for instance 
(Tilly 2008; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Marx, Rihoux, and Ragin 2014; Schneider and 
Wagemann 2010). 
                                                        
